Luhmann's social systems theory and Giddens' structuration theory of action share an emphasis on reflexivity, but focus on meaning along a divide between inter-human communication and intentful action as two different systems of reference. Recombining these two theories, simulations of interaction, organization, and self-organization of intentional communication can be distinguished by using algorithms from the computation of anticipatory systems. The self-organizing and organizing layers remain rooted in the double contingency of the human encounter which provides the variation.
Introduction
In order to explain the difference between "structure" as a property of social networks at each moment of time and a dynamic conceptualization of structure that facilitates and constraints communicative intent in interhuman interactions, Giddens proposed the concept of "structuration" (1976, at p. 120) and related this concept from its very origin to the double hermeneutics operating in intentional interactions among humans beings. A double hermeneutics is possible in interhuman communication because one can understand someone else as another participant in the communication in addition to observing and interpreting the behavior of the other.
The difference between "action" as an observable practice versus "interaction" based on intersubjective understanding can be traced back to Weber's Economy and Society ([1922], 1978) . However, Schutz ([1932] 1967, at p. 8) noted that Weber had not sufficiently elaborated on the distinction between human action as a unit providing meaning and the interpretation of meaning as a cultural object. Husserl's phenomenological critique of the positive sciences (1929, 1936) and Parsons' concept of "double contingency" (1951 Parsons' concept of "double contingency" ( , 1968 cf. Mead, 1934) provide relatively independent sources of what can be considered as fundamental background to the sociological enterprise: inter-human interactions can be expected to have both a practical component and communicative meaning (Habermas, 1981) .
While all human practice is embedded in a structured historicity, the intentional part is not structured, but structurated: it includes and constitutes different time horizons of meaning by enabling and constraining further actions and expectations. For Giddens (1976) , language and semiosis within language provided the model for this theory of "structuration." Structuration was defined by Giddens (1979, at p. 66) as the conditions governing the continuity and transformation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of systems.
While structures can thus be considered as properties of social systems, systems were defined by Giddens (1979, at p. 66) as "reproduced relations between actors or collectivities as regular social practices." Systems, in other words, are instantiated in observable networks of relations (Giddens, 1984) . The "duality of structure" is then proposed as a recursive operation which transforms aggregates of action into systems by invoking structuration as a "virtual" operation. Whereas structures can be analyzed as latent properties of communication systems (at each moment of time), structuration transforms both actions and structures (of social systems) over time by providing them with reconstructed meaning.
Without any references to Giddens, but based on the same sources-that is, Husserl's supra-individual intentionality and Parsons' double contingency- Luhmann (1984) proposed a theory of social systems in which the communication of meaning is considered as the distinguishing characteristic of a social system. The communication of meaning is structured by processes of codification. Codification can be considered as a self-organized result of communications operating reflexively upon one another.
Differentiation among the codes in the communication enables the communication systems and the reflexive carriers of communication to process more complexity.
Using another concept of Parsons (1963 Parsons ( , 1968 , namely, symbolically generalized media of communication, Luhmann further proposed that these symbolic generalizations can be operationalized in terms of functionally different codes of communication. For example, political discourse is coded differently from scientific discourse and both codes are different from the communication codes operating in economic exchange relations or intimate relationships. In modern societies, the codes have been symbolically generalized at the level of society and can reflexively be instantiated by individuals and organizations.
Unfortunately Luhmann (1975a Luhmann ( , 1984 used a biological metaphor-like DNA as the code that determines reproduction (Künzler, 1987) Giddens (1976, at pp. 142 ff.) critiqued this biological metaphor as follows:
The process of learning a paradigm or language-game as the expression of a form of life is also a process of learning what that paradigm is not: that is to say, learning to mediate it with other, rejected, alternatives, by contrast to which the claims of the paradigm in question are clarified. (at p. 144).
Furthermore, Giddens' (1984, at p. xxxvii) "repudiated" Luhmann's "newer version of Parsonian functionalism" because abstract principles are assumed that would govern the development of society for "functional" reasons. One thus loses a perspective on the openness of the development of society for human action and intentful interventions.
Biological metaphors suggest that these are merely disturbance terms of otherwise autonomous-or in Luhmann's theory autopoietic-developments.
The contradiction between these two approaches can also be considered as another round in the discussion between a structuralist or systems approach versus a human-centered focus on interaction. In my opinion, this simple scheme is unfortunate because one can learn from manoeuvring between the Scylla of Giddens' structuration theory of action and the Charybdis of Luhmann's social systems theory of communication. Whereas Luhmann bracketed human action and intention as analytically outside his systems of social coordination, Giddens could no longer specify the duality of structure as a systems operation because he wished to abstain from reifying an "absent set of differences" (Giddens, 1979, at p. 64; cf. Leydesdorff, 1993 ).
Yet despite the radical differences between (Giddens') action and (Luhmann's) systems theory, reflexivity prevails in the subject matter of both theories. Giddens' structuration theory focuses on reflexivity as constitutive of human action, while Luhmann's theory asks how reflexivity can be codified at a supra-individual level. This distinction in terms of two types of reflexivity finds its origin in Husserl's (1929 Husserl's ( , 1936 phenomenological critique of the positive sciences as an insufficient base for developing the social sciences.
Observable behavior and facts in the social domain cannot be studied only as data input for analysis, but also as events which could have been shaped differently (Bourdieu, 2004) .
Cogitantes and Cogitata
Not incidentally, Husserl (1929) In addition to expectations about our physical and biological realities, we as cogitantes are reflexively able to entertain models about the order of expectations among us. Models provide meaning to the modeled systems, and models can be refined in discourse.
Luhmann proposed to consider such exchanges of meaning as the proper domain of sociology: How are the cogitata structured by interhuman interactions? Note that one has no access to this sociological domain other than in terms of expectations: epistemologically the cogitata remain hypotheses which are part of a theoretical discourse that can be entertained by cogitantes. Parsons ' (1951, 1968) concept of "double contingency" in interhuman communication is used by Luhmann (1995) as the stepping stone for developing a sociological theory about this cogitatum: in addition to our awareness of each other, each can expect the other to be reflexive and to entertain expectations just as we do. These expectations are contingent upon one another, but in a domain different from the physical one. In other words, the relations between potentially different cogitata contain a second contingency: these interactions among expectations are embedded in a social order and social institutions.
Beyond a double contingency in interactions, triple and higher-order contingencies can therefore be expected (Strydom, 1999) .
For example, one can entertain different expectations about others' expectations in private or public configurations. The expectations of third parties matter. Because there is no given order in how the interactions interact, the dynamics of this complex system can be expected to "self-organize" unless an order is imposed. In the latter case, Luhmann (e.g., 1975b Luhmann (e.g., , 2000 proposed to consider the communication as organized. Thus, three levels were distinguished: interaction, organization, and self-organization of communications as communication-theoretical elaborations of Husserl's yet insufficiently specified concept of "intersubjectivity" (Luhmann, 1986) .
Intentionality is grounded in experience and reflexivity at the individual level. Luhmann (1986) used Maturana and Varela's (1980) concept of "structural coupling" for the necessary relationship between the two layers of "intersubjective" communication and agent-based consciousness: the neural network operates in terms of a distribution of neurons firing, but with a self-organizing (autopoietic) dynamic different from those based on recursive interactions among interactions (Maturana, 1978) . Unlike the neural network, however, social order can be considered as res cogitans. The next-order level of expectations is not another agency, but remains part of our reflexive experience. Social order not only cannot operate without human agents, but the content of communication matters for subsequent reflections.
In the second contingency, the meaning of communication at the individual level and at the social level is operationally coupled in terms of possible reflections in addition to the structural coupling between cogitantes and cogitata as two meaning-processing systems.
This operational coupling in the processing of meaning is acknowledged by Luhmann ([1988] 2002) as interpenetration (cf. Parsons, 1968 ), but was not elaborated by him otherwise than by pointing to the evolutionary step of human language as a medium of communication (enabling us to communicate both meaning and uncertainty; cf. Leydesdorff, 2000) . However, this additional coupling between the reflexive operations of the two systems brings Giddens' structuration theory of action back on stage because the "self-organizing" system can no longer operate without reflexive agency. In my opinion, the additional coupling in the second contingency makes Luhmann's communication systems "quasi-autopoietic:" cogitantes are not only the carriers of cogitata, but reflexively they also have access to their substantive content.
In summary, Giddens (1984) and Habermas (1987) were right that Luhmann's theory had meta-biological overtones (Leydesdorff, 2006) . Structural coupling can be considered as a biological mechanism: a network system is "plastic" with reference to the distribution of agents at the nodes firing. However, each agent is in this case counted only as on/off, agency. However, organization in a given historical instance is one degree less complex than the self-organizing dynamics of communications over time. All forward and feedback arrows are possible, and in this sense the system can be considered as infrareflexive (Latour, 1988) . The research problem, however, is to specify these next-order control mechanisms as theoretically informed hypotheses.
By introducing three layers into the cogitata-interaction, organization, and selforganization of communications-Giddens' concept of the duality of structure can be Furthermore, I added to Luhmann's model that individual expectations and the social order of expectations are not only coupled structurally (as a formal mechanism), but also interpenetrate each other, and that this interpenetration makes the autopoiesis (or selforganization) dependent on the reflexivity and communicative competencies at the actor level (Habermas, 1981) . The cogitantes are not only a (formal) precondition for the cogitata, but also shape them operationally because of the prevailing reflexivity. The codes are not given (as in DNA), but remain reflexively under constant reconstruction.
In order to proceed to the operationalization, let me use the specific code of communication in scientific discourse as an example. This code allows scholars to develop discursive knowledge using selections at the network level and as a result of scholarly communications among themselves. Discursive knowledge can be reflected by each participant with communicative competency in a specific domain, for example, a discipline or specialty. Individual reflections can generate new knowledge claims in mutual contingencies with colleagues and interactions among them. These knowledge claims provide interactive variation; the structures of the discourse in the scientific community organize these claims as contributions; and the structuration by the code can be expected to restructure the discourse. Restructuring may be piecemeal, but sometimes reaches to the paradigm level.
Meaning processing cannot be observed directly because meaning originates and remains in the res cogitans. However, the imprint of meaning processing on information processing can be measured, because providing meaning to the observable variation can be expected to operate as a selection mechanism to reduce the prevailing uncertainty. This is formalized in the social sciences, for example, as factor analysis: one can reduce the uncertainty in data by using factor analysis. The factor model reinterprets the data and provides them with new meaning (e.g., factor scores and factor loadings) on the basis of a model.
Providing meaning is a recursive operation, that is, an operation which can be applied to its own outcome: some first-order meanings can later be selected as meanings which make a difference with reference to a latent code in the communication. Analogously, some factor models may be considered as more meaningful than others in the light of theoretical considerations. While the factor model analyzes the complexity in the data in terms of different dimensions, the theoretical update along the time dimension can operate selectively upon the different meanings attributed to the different dimensions distinguished by the factor analysis.
Thus, three levels of meaning processing are involved in the dynamics of meaning (Figure 1) . First, observable human actions can be considered as meaningful interactions in inter-human communication. Unlike agents, communications as events in the second contingency cannot be observed directly but must be inferred from observable behavior (Luhmann, 1995, p. 164) . In other words, meaning is provided by a (mostly implicit) model. The model organizes the communications. When these meanings can also be exchanged, a next-order model of the components in the organization of meaning can be hypothesized. This next-order model structurates the structures, and thus can add to the reduction of uncertainty in the modeled system. I shall use the relations among structural components (operationalized as eigenvectors in a factor model) as a model for measuring structuration among these structural components. Does the configuration of structural components generate a synergy that feeds back as a redundancy on the underlying information processing? Recent developments in entropy statistics enable us to measure this imprint of meaning processing on information processing as redundancy (Krippendorff, 2009a and b; Leydesdorff, 2009a and forthcoming) .
As noted, meaning processing (in the second contingency) cannot be measured directly.
However, simulations allow us to specify the non-linear dynamics of meaning processing.
Let me proceed by first specifying the mechanisms of double contingency, interaction, organization, and self-organization among expectations in terms of simulations elaborating on algorithms from the computation of anticipatory systems (Dubois, 1998; Leydesdorff, 2008) . I shall thereafter provide an empirical example of "structuration" as the generation of redundancy using intellectual (self-)organization in a set of scientific articles. Intellectual organization can be considered as a supra-individual model of the textual domain which can leave traces within this domain.
The theory and computation of anticipatory systems
Reflexive systems can entertain models of (series of) events in a first contingency using a second contingency of expectations. In addition to mental models of cognitive agents, models can be exchanged among cogitantes in a cogitatum, and thus discursive knowledge at the network level. Note that this networked system of expectations is reflected by human agents who perform additionally a life-cycle in the present. However, the cogitata and the cogitantes can be expected to operate with different dynamics.
The mathematical biologist Rosen (1985) defined anticipatory systems as systems which are able to entertain models. Dubois (1998) further distinguished between weak and strong anticipation: weakly anticipatory systems can entertain models, but strongly anticipatory systems are able to use these models for the construction of their own future states. This assumes that the models can be processed or, in other words, that meanings can be selectively exchanged and also refined. The resulting cogitatum thus can be expected to develop a further dynamics of its own. This cogitatum remains reflexively available to all the cogitantes who can contribute to its reconstruction reflexively.
The cogitatum provides meaning to the modeled system by anticipating a possible future state. Thus, the arrow of time is reversed in the instantiation by a cogitans. In other words, the cogitatum incurs on the cogitantes as an expectation about possible future states.
While cogitantes develop recursively in historical time (the present t) in relation to their previous state (at t -1), the anticipation in the modeling subroutine (e.g., a mental model) incurs as a feedback on the modeled system in the present. The model advances on the modeled system by exploring possible states at a next moment of time (t + 1), that is, hyper-incursively.
This concept of the arrow of time as a degree of freedom has been crucial to the elaboration of the theory and computation of anticipatory systems during the last two decades. It is pertinent to the the communication of meaning because meaning is provided from the perspective of hindsight, that is, incursively. A modeling system provides meaning to the modeled one. The communication of meaning, however, adds another degree of freedom: translations among differently coded meanings become possible, and the exchange process among the expectations in a hyper-cycle can generate hyper-incursivity. Hyper-incursion presumes that the cogitantes are hypothesizing a next (anticipated) state of the system (at t + 1 or later). When the hypotheses are entertained in a discourse, they can provide a reconstructive feedback to the realization of the system in the present.
For example, Ego's expectations about Alter's expectations, as in the case of the above definition of "double contingency," can be considered as a hyper-incursion. Ego operates in the present (as x t ) on the basis of an expectation of its own next state (x t+1 ) and the next state of an Alter Ego (1 -x t+1 ). This can be modeled as follows: 
Note that the system under study in Equation 3 can no longer be considered as a cogitans because it fails to include a self-referential part; only expectations are operating selectively upon each other. The new system is the result of interactions between two cogitantes as subroutines of a next-order interaction system which we denote again in the abstract as x. However, this interaction system is a social system, and no longer a psychological one.
Equation 3 can be elaborated as follows: The interaction system oscillates to variable degrees around the value of one. On average, the interaction drifts around x = 1 without ever reaching this value. The system reaches its largest fluctuations (between zero and two) for b = 2. 3 On each side, the interaction can be continued for a number of iterations before the alternate oscillation resumes its operation. I modeled this here (in Excel) by using a random number to choose the plus or minus sign in the evaluation of Equation 3c. Randomness in the variation warrants the continuation of the interaction. In other words, interactions serve to generate variation in the cogitatum.
The organization and self-organization of interactions
Equation 3 can be extended for the case of complex configurations of interactions by adding a third selection mechanism to Equation 1 with either a hyper-incursive or incursive subroutine:
Equation 4 is a cubic equation which models a "triple contingency" of expectations (Strydom, 1999) . The equation has one real and two complex solutions. 4 Since the system cannot continue its operations further with the complex solutions, this system 5 , however, the interaction among expectations is instantiated by a specific historical organization at t = t.
The roots of Equation 5 can be derived (analogously to Eq. 3) as follows:
Simulation of this system shows that the organization of communications vanishes after a variable number of steps for all values of the parameter d (Figure 3 ). . In this case, the root of this equation becomes complex and can no longer be evaluated. In other words, the organization does not disappear because of "dying," but the historical development of a specific organization can be expected to become insufficiently complex to instantiate self-organization among the fluxes of communication.
In summary, organization of communications is a historical practice; specific organizational forms can be replaced by other organizations because of the ongoing interactions-introducing variation-and the hyper-incursive self-organization of the communication into codes (Equation 4). Luhmann (1995 Luhmann ( , at p. 600n. [1984 expressed this relationship among the three mechanisms in the social coordination of expectations as follows:
in all social relations, under all circumstances a difference between society and interaction is unavoidable, but not all societies are acquainted with organized social systems.
We therefore exclude organizations, but only from treatment on the level of a general theory of social systems. On the next level, that is, of concretizing the theory, one would perhaps need to distinguish between societal systems, organizational systems, and interaction systems and develop separate theories for each type because these three separate ways of forming systems (i.e., dealing with doubling contingency) cannot be reduced to one another."
Three analytically different equations (Equations 3 to 5) could be used to model these three (sub)dynamics on the basis of the initial equation (Eq. 1) which modeled double contingency as the fundamental operation. Unlike the hyper-incursive dynamics of interaction and self-organization which operate against the axis of time, organization structures communication at specific moments of time by using incursion. These instantiations also provide room for supra-individual (e.g., institutional) agency. Like (but different from) double contingency as the fundamental operation at the level of the cogitans, organizations can synchronously entertain different expectations because they are both complex and loop into the present state x t .
Perhaps, the cogitans could be considered from this perspective as a minimal form of organization among expectations. Unlike the cogitans, however, organizations do not necessarily run an incursive routine which roots the system (x t ) into an historical identity with reference to a previous state 
The measurement of the imprint of meaning-processing
The concept of the historical interfacing of differently coded expectations in both organizations and reflexive agents brings us back to the possibility of measurement.
Historical events can be analyzed in the first contingency where (Shannon-type) information or uncertainty is processed and information theory can therefore be applied.
While historical operations (along the arrow of time) necessarily generate uncertainty-the second law is equally valid for probabilistic entropy 5 -evolutionary feedback against the arrow of time can reduce the uncertainty.
Providing meaning to information adds to the domain of historical events how these events could have been different. Thus, the number of possible states of the system under study is enlarged and redundancy is generated. While at the level of each individual only thoughts and perceptions can be entertained reflexively, a model circulating in the intersubjective domain may reconstruct social reality hyper-incursively by extending the communication system(s) with new options.
How would a historical system entertaining a model of itself be affected by this extension of its range of possibility? The different subdynamics (forward and backward) can be expected to operate concurrently, but they can be distinguished analytically. One cannot measure the redundancy R generated by hyper-incursive modeling, but its effect can be measured historically with the signed information measure μ* ( (Krippendorff, 2009a and b; Yeung, 2009, pp. 51 ff.) . This information measure-unlike a Shannon measure-is signed, that is, it can be positive, negative, or zero. If μ* < 0, then uncertainty in the system is reduced because of the model entertained in the system. In other words, μ* measures the incursion in the instantiation.
Modeled system
Organization "structures" at each moment of time Krippendorff (2009a) showed that this information measure should not be considered as probabilistic entropy (cf. Watanabe, 1960) . In Shannon's (1948) theory the reception of a message cannot feed back on the sending of the message, and the transmission can therefore not be negative. In a follow-up study, Krippendorff (2009b) proposed taking the value of this measure as an indicator of the difference between the redundancy R generated by an observer who entertains a model of the system (but is not yet informed about the historical interactions in the system), and the (Shannon-type) interaction information I which he denoted as I ABC→AB:AC:BC (Figure 4 ).
In other words, the value of μ* indicates the difference between the redundancy (R) created by the modeling system and information generated by the three-way interaction information (I) in the modeled system. The modeled system can also be considered as an instantiation of self-organization in the sense of Equations 5 and 4, respectively. If the value of μ* is measured as negative entropy, the uncertainty in the modeled system is reduced because of the modeling. If μ* > 0, an increase of uncertainty is indicated or-in other words-historicity prevails in the net result. As noted, the modeling is based on exchanges of meaning among the meaningful communications. In terms of the model in Figure 1 , factor analysis provides us first with the structural components in the respective data matrices. This corresponds with the step between level I of data and level II of structure in Figure 1 . The entropy statistics among the factor loadings provide us with a means to measure structuration at the next-order level III.
While structure is historical and contained in the textual organization, structuration is based on next-order intellectual organization. Intellectual organization can be expected to operate in this set-representing the core of a community publishing in a specialist journal-by potentially reducing uncertainty. Intellectual self-organization at the specialty level leaves its imprint in the textual organization, and this can be measured in terms of exchanges among these texts and communalities in the sharing of textual symbols (e.g., words, author names, references, etc.; cf. De Nooy & Leydesdorff, 2009; Lucio-Arias & Leydesdorff, 2009 ). Figure 5 shows that author names do not indicate intellectual organization of the set in terms of a negative value of the mutual information among the three main components (μ* = + 48.4 mbits). Using the matrix of title words, however, intellectual organization of the set is indicated by a negative value of μ* (= -57.3 mbits). Combination of these two sets of variables shows a stronger synergetic effect among the three main components (μ* = -127.9 mbits) and also reveals that in this case the latent dimensions are codified to such an extent that a historical interaction term among them (I ABC→AB:AC:BC = + 96.5 mbits) can also be measured (while the title words were not sufficiently codified for this effect). 7 In other words, these combined dimensions leave an imprint in the historical record. The intellectual organization, which remains volatile, is retained in the archive in terms of the combination of words and authors as markers.
These results accord with the sociological expectation: author names indicate social networks and are by themselves not sufficiently informative about intellectual organization; title words are used flexibly, but are organized intellectually (Leydesdorff, 1989 and 1997) . In combination with author names, title words can be used to indicate intellectual organization at a next-order level. Intellectual structuration ("selforganization") remains unmeasurable (since res cogitans), but its effects can be measured as the imprints that the structuring code leaves on the structures in the textual organization of a journal.
Conclusions and discussion
The two elaborations provided here to the concept of self-organization and structuration of expectations are different. On the one side, the mechanisms operating in the cogitatum can only be modeled and simulated, but not measured. On the other, the measurement is by definition limited to the difference that meaning processing in the second contingency may make for information processing in the first one. Only information processing can be measured. However, one can distinguish between the information processing itself and the feedback which the processing of information experiences from the meaning processing at a next-order level. This feedback may lead to a measurable reduction of uncertainty. (Giddens, 1976) , "emic" versus "epic" (Geertz, 1973) , organization versus self-organization of communication (Luhmann, 1975b) , and "lifeworld" versus "system" (Habermas, 1981) have made clear that the second Positivismusstreit (Adorno et al., 1969) has not yet been resolved: the social sciences study not only "facts," but also, and perhaps more importantly, what these facts mean (Mulkay et al., 1983; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) .
I have recombined notably Giddens' and Luhmann's contributions because both these authors introduced abstract concepts for the operation of meaning in social systems. Giddens (1979) proposed "structuration" without specifying it otherwise than in terms of its consequences for reflexive agents and their institutions. He suggested that structuration on the basis of aggregates of actions restructures structures as "sets of rules and resources." I submit that structuration can be considered as an effect of the non-linear dynamics of interactions among agents. Interactions among interactions can lead to evolution, self-organization, and the temporary organization of expectations.
Luhmann proposed using the model of autopoiesis or self-organization, which he borrowed from neurophysiology (Maturana & Varela, 1980 ) but wished to apply to the self-organization of meaning in communication. However, the biological metaphor presumed a supposedly "closed" systems theory in which the functions of language (Habermas, 1987; Künzler, 1987) and reflexive agency (Giddens, 1984) were not sufficiently appreciated. During the 1990s, this theory increasingly became a (metabiological) philosophy more than a sociology. Self-organization in the communication of meaning can be considered as one among various subdynamics which disturb one another.
A third scholar relevant to this discussion is Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu (2004, at p. 78) speaks of a "transcendental unconscious" in which the knowing subject unknowingly invests by restructuring it. This "habitus" then can be considered as a historical transcendental of the subject "which can be said to be a priori inasmuch as it is a structuring structure which organizes the perception and appreciation of all experience, and a posteriori inasmuch as it is a structured structure produced by a whole series of common or individual learning processes." Although this "habitus" can be social as a role, Bourdieu's model tends to share with Giddens-and Parsons-the idea that actions and not interactions are the operators that introduce variation into the social system.
In my opinion, one advantage of Giddens' concept of "structuration" is its reference to a systems operation without identifying a "self" as in Luhmann's concept of "selforganization." Unlike Giddens, however, I did not focus on agency but on expectations, since the latter can be communicated. Thus, one can reformulate Giddens' structuration theory of action into a structuration theory of expectations. In addition to the behavioral component, action can be considered as a means to communicate expectations; expectations, however, are communicated in a cogitatum and are not directly observable.
The communication of expectations can develop a dynamic of its own, for example, when codes of communication emerge and thereafter can be stabilized and/or symbolically generalized. Entertaining these hypotheses enables us to study the domain of inter-human interactions without reification.
A stabilized code of communication can be expected to lead to a hierarchy in the organizational structures given a single code. Symbolically generalized codes of communication can also be differentiated, and thus provide one more degree of freedom to the communication of meaning than in the case of an identifiable system. Luhmann's concept of "self-organization" for this configuration, however, remains dependent on the biological metaphor of an identifiable "self" and functionalism. As the cogitatum is differentiated into cogitata, an identifiable self can no longer be expected. In other words, the cogitatum should not even metaphorically be considered as a cogitans. Therefore, I
prefer Giddens' concept of "structuration" which adds the structured dynamics of expectations to their structuring at each moment of time. Unlike Giddens, however, this is not a structuration theory of action, but a structuration theory of expectations.
What has thus been gained since Husserl's (1935/36 Husserl (1929, at p. 138) regretted that he could not specify the mental predicates for studying this "layer of meaning which provides the human world and culture, as such with a specific meaning" other than as an analogy to the categories of philosophical reflection by the cogito, that is as a (meta-psychological) transcendency. I submit that further elaborations of information theory and the theory and computation of anticipatory systems may provide us with categories for studying the evolution of the cogitata as inter-human coordination systems and thus as a proper subject of sociological analysis.
